Rethinking the US Strategic National Stockpile for Future Pandemics with Inventory, Capacity, and Capability

The response to COVID-19 as a public health emergency raised questions about preparedness against future pandemics. The US Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) with medically critical items such as ventilators and personal protection equipment for major public health emergencies proved to be inadequate in the first half of 2020. We seek to address how governments or other disaster management organizations should modify their stockpile approach for a more robust response to disasters than was the case in 2020. To this end, we argue that a “strategic reserve” against rare public health emergencies must not only have inventory but also backup capacity and standby capability. With a highly skewed “demand” distribution reflecting a rarely occurring pandemic or other disasters, we present a three-tiered approach comprising stockpile inventory as the first tier, backup capacity as the second, and standby capability to manufacture as the third. © 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

The US Strategic National Stockpile Ventilators in Coronavirus Disease 2019: A Comparison of Functionality and Analysis Regarding the Emergency Purchase of 200,000 Devices.

BACKGROUND: Early in the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, there was serious concern that the United States would encounter a shortfall of mechanical ventilators. In response, the US government, using the Defense Production Act, ordered the development of 200,000 ventilators from 11 different manufacturers. These ventilators have different capabilities, and whether all are able to support COVID-19 patients is not evident. RESEARCH QUESTION: Evaluate ventilator requirements for affected COVID-19 patients, assess the clinical performance of current US Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) ventilators employed during the pandemic, and finally, compare ordered ventilators' functionality based on COVID-19 patient needs. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: Current published literature, publicly available documents, and lay press articles were reviewed by a diverse team of disaster experts. Data were assembled into tabular format, which formed the basis for analysis and future recommendations. RESULTS: COVID-19 patients often develop severe hypoxemic acute respiratory failure and adult respiratory defense syndrome (ARDS), requiring high levels of ventilator support. Current SNS ventilators were unable to fully support all COVID-19 patients, and only approximately half of newly ordered ventilators have the capacity to support the most severely affected patients; ventilators with less capacity for providing high-level support are still of significant value in caring for many patients. INTERPRETATION: Current SNS ventilators and those on order are capable of supporting most but not all COVID-19 patients. Technologic, logistic, and educational challenges encountered from current SNS ventilators are summarized, with potential next-generation SNS ventilator updates offered.

The Strategic National Stockpile: identification, support, and acquisition of medical countermeasures for CBRN incidents.

The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) serves as a repository of materiel, including medical countermeasures (MCMs), that would be used to support the national health security response to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident, either natural or terrorism-related. To support and advance the SNS, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) manages targeted investigatory research portfolios, such as Countermeasures Against Chemical Terrorism (CounterACT) for chemical agents, that coordinate projects covering basic research, drug discovery, and preclinical studies. Project BioShield, managed by the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Agency (BARDA), guides and supports academia and industry with potential MCMs through the Food & Drug Administration's approval process and ultimately supports the acquisition of successful products into the SNS. Public health emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the ever-increasing number of MCMs in the SNS present logistical and financial challenges to its maintenance. While MCMs for biological agents have been readily adopted, those for chemical agents have required sustained investments. This paper reviews the methods by which MCMs are identified and supported for inclusion in the SNS, the current status of MCMs for CBRN threats, and challenges with SNS maintenance as well as identifies persistent obstacles for MCM development and acquisition, particularly for ones focused on chemical weapons.

A Commons for a Supply Chain in the Post-COVID-19 Era: The Case for a Reformed Strategic National Stockpile.

Policy Points Reflecting on current response deficiencies, we offer a model for a national contingency supply chain cell (NCSCC) construct to manage the medical materials supply chain in support of emergencies, such as COVID-19. We develop the following: a framework for governance and response to enable a globally independent supply chain; a flexible structure to accommodate the requirements of state and county health systems for receiving and distributing materials; and a national material "control tower" to improve transparency and real-time access to material status and location. CONTEXT: Much of the discussion about the failure of the COVID-19 supply chain has centered on personal protective equipment (PPE) and the degree of vulnerability of care. Prior research on supply chain risks have focused on mitigating the risk of disruptions of specific purchased materials within a bounded region or on the shifting status of cross-border export restrictions. But COVID-19 has impacted every purchase category, region, and border. This paper is responsive to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine recommendation to study and monitor disasters and to provide governments with course of action to satisfy legislative mandates. METHODS: Our analysis draws on our observations of the responses to COVID-19 in regard to acquisition and contracting problem-solving, our review of field discussions and interactions with experts, a critique of existing proposals for managing the strategic national stockpile in the United States a mapping of the responses to national contingency planning phases, and the identification of gaps in current national healthcare response policy frameworks and proposals. FINDINGS: Current proposals call for augmenting a system that has failed to deliver the needed response to COVID-19. These proposals do not address the key attributes for pandemic plan renewal: flexibility, traceability and transparency, persistence and responsiveness, global independence, and equitable access. We offer a commons-based framework for achieving the opportunities and risks which are responsive to a constellation of intelligence assets working in and across focal targets of global supply chain risk. CONCLUSIONS: The United States needs a "commons-based strategy" that is not simply a stockpile repository but instead is a network of repositories, fluid inventories, and analytic monitoring governed by the experts. We need a coordinated effort, a "commons" that will direct both conventional and new suppliers to meet demands and to eliminate hoarding and other behaviors.